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 Abstract 
 
This study analyzes the restructuring of a national economy by identifying the career pathways of its 
enterprises.  This analysis is conducted in a setting strategically chosen as a case of rapid and profound 
economic transformation: the postsocialist Hungarian economy between 1988-2000. 
The goal of this study is to chart the multiple pathways of property transformation.  Property 
pathways are conceptualized as the patterned sequences of change that firms undergo 1) in the 
composition of their ownership structure and 2) in their position within network structures of ties 
to other enterprises. These career pathways are neither unidirectional nor plotted in advance. The 
landscape and topography of the socioeconomic field are given shape and repeatedly transformed 
by the interaction of the multiple strategies of firms attempting to survive in the face of variable 
political, institutional, and market uncertainties. These different types of uncertainties will have 
different temporalities, and the study explores whether and how they increase or diminish in 
various periods.  We develop and test specific hypotheses about how enterprise pathways along 
the compositional and positional property dimensions are related to the shifting contexts of these 
types of uncertainty. 
 
The core dataset for this study includes the complete ownership histories of approximately 1,800 
of the largest enterprises in Hungary for a twelve year period, starting with the collapse of 
communism in 1989, recording each change in a company’s top 25 owners on a monthly basis.  
Monthly entries for each enterprise also include changes in top management, boards of directors, 
major lines of product activity, raising or lowering of capital, and location of establishments and 
branch offices, as well as the dates of founding, mergers, bankruptcy, etc. Data on revenues, 
number of employees, and operating profit will be compiled from annual balance sheets.   
 
These rich data make it possible to map the life cycles of the business groups that are formed by 
network ties among enterprises, identifying not only when they arise, merge, or dissipate, but also 
the changing shapes of their network properties.   
 
To identify patterns of change, the study draws on sequence analysis, a research tool  that makes 
possible the study of historical processes in an eventful way similar to historiography while 
retaining social scientific abstraction.  Whereas sequence analysis has given us a perspective on 
careers as historical processes but has not been applied to business organizations, network 
analysis has been applied to business organizations but has not been done historically. The 
methodological innovation at the heart of this study is to combine the tools of sequence analysis 
and network analysis to yield a sequence analysis of changing network positions. 
 
Keywords: social network analysis, post socialism, Eastern Europe, historical sociology, 






Business organizations today face the challenge of adapting to a transforming global economy: 
enterprises must increasingly cope with market volatility and the extraordinarily rapid pace of 
technological change. Under conditions of complex strategy horizons (Lane and Maxfield 1996) 
and rugged fitness landscapes (Kauffman 1989) where dislocations can be anticipated in general 
but are unpredictable in their specific contours, firms confront a radical uncertainty. In attempts to 
cope with these uncertainties, firms create hybrid organizational forms and build networks of 
strategic alliances (Powell 1996; Powell, Koput, and White 2001; Stuart 1998, 2000; Gulati and 
Gargiulo 1999; Beckman, et al 2000; Lane 2000; Kogut, Shan, and Walker 1992; Sabel 1990).   
 
During the past decade, perhaps the most acute forms of radical uncertainty were those 
confronting enterprises in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Here the sources of 
uncertainty were less directly technological. More importantly, firms faced an uncertain 
economic and institutional environment. With the demise of the old COMECON alliance that 
regulated trade among the socialist economies, firms watched the collapse of their once secured 
trading partners.  Literally within a month, and not at the margin but in overwhelming 
proportions, they had to seek new suppliers and new customers. They would do so in an 
institutional environment of extreme complexity. Newly elected democratic governments were 
dismantling the socialist planning apparatus and launching ambitious programs of privatization. 
From one month to the next, government agencies promulgated regulations governing banking, 
bankrupcty, accounting, contracting, foreign direct investment, and corporate governance. For 
firms remaining in state ownership, for recently “privatized” firms, and for new start-up firms 
alike, the challenge was to navigate through a maze of new policies.  
 
How have postsocialist firms attempted to cope with these radical uncertainties? Which strategies 
have been successful and which were deadends?  Were some firms able to survive, perhaps even 
to prosper, by consistently adopting the same bundle of practices across the entire epoch of 
transformation from 1989 into the 21st Century? Or were there path dependencies (Arthur 1994) 
operating in which firms locked-in to strategies that were successful in one set of external 
conditions but that proved less effective when conditions changed?  Were some firms able to 
survive to the present through a process of almost continuous morphing by repeatedly shifting 
strategies throughout the epoch?  Or was too much change a liability leading to failure?  More 
discriminately, was the pace of change a positive factor in some periods while a liability in 
others?   If the cross-sectional distribution of types of firms and types of strategies differs across 
time, was this a result of replacement (firms of some types fail and are replaced by firms of other 
types) or was it a result of adaptation (firms changing from some types to others)?   In short, what 
were the pathways of transformation?   
 
We will analyze the restructuring of a national economy by identifying the career pathways of its 
enterprises. We conceptualize career pathways as the patterned sequences of changes that firms 
undergo 1) in their ownership structure and 2) in their position within networks of enterprises. We 
conduct this analysis in a setting strategically chosen as a case of rapid and profound economic 
transformation: the postsocialist Hungarian economy between 1989-2000. To carry out this study 
we are constructing datasets that include the complete histories of the changes in ownership, top 
management, boards of directors, and other organizational change events for 1,800 of the largest 
Hungarian enterprises. Because these data chart changes on a monthly basis, we are able to 
mobilize a set of research tools that innovatively combine network analysis and sequence analysis 





In the mid 1990s, Stark (1996) investigated how Hungarian firms were responding to the 
uncertainties of postsocialism. Drawing on a repertoire of research methods – ethnographic 
research in firms, the analysis of government agency documents, and the analysis of the 
ownership records of the 200 largest enterprises (ranked by revenues) and top 25 banks (ranked 
by assets) in 1994 – Stark identified an ensemble of practices that he labeled “recombinant 
property.”  Its two major features were hybrid property forms and inter-enterprise ownership 
networks.       
 
Stark argued that the simple public/private dichotomy that was dominant in policy circles and 
scholarly research on privatization was inadequate to understand the actual processes of property 
transformation in postsocialism (for a related view on organizational change in China see Walder 
1994, 1995; Guthrie 1997; and Zhou 2000a, 2000b).   In place of a switch from public to private, 
many firms were combining public and private ownership. Because there was uncertainty about 
which institutional rules would count in a given situation, they engaged in organizational hedging 
(Sabel and Zeitlin, 1996), attempting to hold resources that could be mobilized in more than one 
justificatory framework. Rather than moving in one direction they moved in several, 
reconfiguring resources into new organizational forms. Sociological accounts of economic 
transformation must take into account the multi-directionalities at play in major social upheavals 
(Stark and Bruszt 1998; Padgett 2000). 
 
Complementary to organizational hybridity as a response to uncertainty, inter-enterprise 
ownership networks, Stark argued, served as a strategy to spread risk.  Like mountain climbers 
assaulting a treacherous face, postsocialist firms used networks of cross-ownership as the safety 
ropes binding them together.  Using a combination of block-modeling and cliquing analysis of the 
“Top 200” data from the mid ‘90s, Stark and his colleagues (Stark, Kemeny, and Breiger 2000) 
identified eight major Hungarian business groups formed through these inter-enterprise 
ownership ties. 
 
Stark stressed that recombinant property might increase chances of survival without increasing 
performance. Some firms were diversifying their portfolio of resources (blurring the boundaries 
of public and private), for the purpose of socializing liabilities while privatizing assets; and 
business group networks were a means not only of risk-spreading but of risk-shedding in a 
context in which policies of credit-worthiness and debt forgiveness were highly politicized.   
 
Stark’s observations of Hungarian enterprises were made at approximately the mid-point between 
the collapse of state socialism in 1989 and the present.  We will not, however, take another static 
snapshot – as if the task were merely to repeat the original study at a later moment in time.  
Instead, we conduct a rigorous analysis of the entire epoch from 1989-2000.  By widening the 
scope in time and by widening the depth of enterprises studied (from the top 200 firms to the top 
500 in any given year), we can assess the prevalence of recombinant practices and trace their rise 
and demise in comparison to the full set of competing and coexisting enterprise strategies.  To do 
so, we introduce more finely-grained categories of property, refine the concept of business groups 
by differentiating their network properties, and specify the types of uncertainties that were 
prevalent at different periods within the time-span of the study.   
 
For a sociological account of historical processes. 
 
The goal of this study is to chart the typical career pathways that firms negotiate through a 
sequence of changes in the composition of their ownership structure and the typical pathways that 
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firms navigate as they move through a sequence of changes in their position in network 
structures.  These “careers” are neither unidirectional nor plotted in advance.  The landscape and 
topography of the socioeconomic field are given shape and repeatedly transformed by the 
interaction of the multiple strategies of firms attempting to survive in the face of political, 
institutional, and market uncertainties. We expect that these different types of uncertainties will 
have different temporalities, and we explore whether and how they increase or diminish in 
various periods.  We develop and test specific hypotheses about how enterprise pathways along 
our compositional and positional property dimensions are related to the shifting contexts of these 
types of uncertainty.  Our task is to produce a sociological account of historical processes.   
 
To identify the multiple pathways taken by Hungarian enterprises across our twelve year time 
frame, we draw on sequence analysis, a new research tool that makes it possible to study 
historical processes in an eventful way similar to historiography while retaining social scientific 
abstraction (see especially Abbott 1990, 1992, 1995). With its roots in the study of gene 
sequencing in biology, sequence analysis has been applied in sociology predominantly to the 
careers of persons (Abbott and Hrycak 1990; Abbott 1995;  Stovel, Savage, and Bearman 1996; 
Blair-Loy 1999).  By our novel application of sequence analysis to the “careers” of enterprises, 
we extend it to economic sociology.  Instead of collapsing time to before-after dichotomies, 
sequence analysis reveals the variable structuring of time: the varying paces of change, path 
dependencies, turning points, lock-ins, and contingencies – in ways that differ from simple 
calendar time.  To study the unfolding of multiple, parallel processes, sequence analysis provides 
a methodology to follow, with much detail and rigor, events at the socially meaningful level of 
action.  These events, changes within a state-space that is not assumed in advance but emerges 
from the analysis, are the building blocks of sequences.    
 
How do we build from events to patterned processes?  At the level of the firm, we gather data 
about attributes with a finely-grained resolution of one-month intervals.  These data include, for 
example, the firm’s owners, its directors, its managers, its major lines of product activity, capital, 
revenues, profitability, and so on (see the data section below for details).  From these data we 
construct the state-space for each of the relevant dimensions of the study, using clustering 
algorithms to identify the set of possible states (types). Within the state-space of firm ownership, 
for example, a possible state is that a firm is fully state-owned; other possible states are that it is 
held by a coalition of other Hungarian firms, or held by coalition ownership plus a private 
individual, or the majority holding of a foreign multinational, and so on.  (The actual state-space 
is more elaborated. See the analytic strategies section below for details.)  Thus, for each of the 
144 time intervals in our study we can report the state (the configuration of relevant attributes) of 
a given firm.  We record each firm’s re-positioning within the state-space as a 144-length 
sequence.  
 
As with the work histories of persons, it is unlikely that two firms will have exactly the same 
histories.  But as with human careers, it is also unlikely that every enterprise history will be so 
unique as not to share similarities to those of others.  As in the study of human careers, so in the 
study of enterprise histories, we as sociologists, are interested in identifying patterns.  Are there 
typical careers?  What is their patterning?  Applying an algorithm to the distinct sequences of all 
of the firms in our study, we cluster sequences to identify the relatively discrete career pathways.    
 
Having identified the typical pathways, our task will be to interpret their varying contours.  
Pathways will differ in their directionality but also in their temporality, and so we will be attuned 
to how acceleration or deceleration in the pace of change varies within and across pathways.  The 
notion of pathway, of course, implies some degree of path dependency – from a particular course 
there is not an equal probability of moving to any of the possible states. But sequence analysis 
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also allows us to identify turning points (Abbott 1997), critical configurations of events in which 
a pathway changes directionality.  It is important to emphasize that turning points are the 
properties of pathways and are not derived directly from macro properties of the system or of 
changes in the institutional environment.  That is, although it is customary to think about a major 
political event as a turning point (e.g., “the new banking law marked a turning point in 
government policy”), our method allows us to take such changes into account without assuming 
that they will have invariant effects across all pathways. In fact, part of our contribution to the 
institutionalist literature in economic sociology will be to assess how major institutional changes 
in regulatory policies such as privatization, accounting, banking, and bankrupcty induced turning 
points in some pathways while leaving others on their previous trajectories.    
 
A theoretical and methodological turning point.  
 
Our study is a turning point in economic sociology. Whereas sequence analysis has given us a 
perspective on careers as historical processes but has not been applied to business organizations, 
network analysis has been applied to business organizations but has not been done historically.  
The historical sociology that we are attempting is more ambitious than bringing sequence analysis 
into economic sociology.  The methodological innovation at the heart of our study is to combine 
the tools of sequence analysis and network analysis to yield a sequence analysis of changing 
network positions.   
 
For several decades, the methodology of social network analysis was almost exclusively applied 
to static snapshots of relational systems. In the most recent major handbook for social network 
analysis, for example, we find only one paragraph on longitudinal or dynamic network analysis in 
the chapter on “Future Directions” (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Subsequent to that writing, 
some network analysts have taken a growing interest in dynamics.  Two lines of work stand out in 
this development. On one side, we find analysis of the micro dynamics of dyads (Gulati and 
Gargiulo 1999; Iacobucci 1989; Lincoln, Gerlach, and Takahashi 1992; Snijders 1990; Snijders 
2001; Stuart 1998; Zeggelink 1994).  On the other, we find analysis of the macro dynamics of 
whole network systems (Brudner and White 1997; Powell, White, and Koput 2001; Watts 1999) 
with an emerging part of the latter literature inspired and influenced by physics (e.g., Barabási, 
Albert, and Jeong 1999). 
 
We find these developments exciting, but still insufficiently historical.  On the first side, the logic 
of the dynamic study of dyads is similar to time series models: values of variables at time point t 
are used to estimate values at time point t+1, where the cases are dyads. On the second, the logic 
of the study of macro network dynamics is to find functions for change in connectivity, 
clustering, etc. based on assumptions of network parameters (for example, the way in which new 
ties are created, the number of ties each node has, and so on).   Operating primarily with lagged 
variables in regression models rather than pathways of network events with turning points (but 
see Powell et al 2001), these new directions introduce dynamism while still lacking an historical 
dimension.  Attention to change between two network snapshots or analysis of the dynamism of 
networks is not equal to recognizing multiple temporalities. [ 
 
Our conception of the structuring of time thus differs from conceptions prevalent in current 
modeling.  On one hand, the still predominant transition views on economic change means a 
focus on the ideal typical starting and ending points of change. In a transition logic change is a 
succession of two systems, a switch from one equilibrium to the other. On the other hand, 
dynamic views of time series or network systems treat time as a dimension, a continuous variable 
along which a predefined process (inflation, growth of a dense central component) unfolds. Both 
approaches leave some or all aspects of the structure of time unquestioned. While transition 
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approaches hardly conceptualize time at all, dynamic approaches treat it as a background 
metronome for predefined processes. Our approach is to put time as a central dimension and 
identify the multiplicity of times, multiple processes that establish the context to one another. 
This means that we do not posit any external predefined metric to judge the speed, direction and 
temporality of processes, but let each process be judged in the context of all other processes.  For 
example the speed of a process of gradual privatization of firms (say the share of the state 
declines 10% each year in favor of private owners) will be judged faster if all other processes are 
stalled (no ownership changes occur for a period) and will be judged slower if there are fast paced 
changes in most of the other processes.   
 
As Harrison White challenges the field: “Social structures often are made to seem the antipodes 
to, or at least unrelated to details and nuances of, sequencing in timing. This is in part because of 
the influence of structuralism.  Social times should instead be accounted as much part of structure 
as are network spaces” (White 1992).   In taking up White’s challenge, our contribution to a more 
historical network analysis does not simply include time as a variable but, instead, recognizes 
time as variable.  Our task will be to chart the life cycles of the business groups that are formed 
by the network ties among enterprises, identifying not only when they arise, merge, or dissipate, 
but also the changes in their configurations (differentiating, for example, star-shaped groups from 
more cohesive cliques).  In doing so, we address Granovetter’s (1994) concern about the “paucity 
of literature on the growth and evolution of business groups.”  We will then turn our attention to 
firms, as actors who weave the network of property or who are woven into (or left out of) such 
networks, by mapping the sequences of changes of each firm’s position in this network space.  
Rather than presenting a block model as a snapshot with the typology of firm positions in a given 
moment (or at multiple moments in time), we present a typology of firm movements in the space 
of network positions. Our purpose is not to identify the block of central firms and the block of 
isolates or bridges, but instead to identify typical careers of how and when firms become central, 
peripheral, or bridging players. And rather than assume a general dependence of alliance ties at 
time t on alliance ties at time t+1 we leave open the possibility for turning points in network 
formation: points when group building turns into rapid network dissolution and the dissipation of 
business groups or when building safety nets against institutional change turns into building 




The comprehensiveness of our dataset is unprecedented in the literature on ownership 
restructuring in a reforming economy.1 The dataset we are assembling includes the complete 
ownership histories of approximately 1,800 of the largest enterprises in Hungary during the 
period from 1989-2000.  We define a large firm as being in the annual ranking of the top 500 
firms (based on revenue) in any of the twelve years.  For a small country like Hungary, our 
inclusion rules mean that our population of firms accounts for more than a third of all 
employment, half of the GDP, and the overwhelming proportion of export revenues (Figyelo, 
2000).  
 
                                                 
1 Similar research projects in the region on inter-enterprise networks cover fewer companies, in less depth, 
over less time. Toth (1998) used two samples of 300 companies (the largest companies based on revenue 
and export volume). His descriptive statistics recorded the presence of a Hungarian firm as an owner 
without constructing the network of ownership ties. Ferlogoj et. al. (2001) have analyzed the networks of 
the largest Slovenian companies based on ownership and board interlock ties in 1997 and 2000. Their 
sample, however, was limited only to the top 150 firms.  Both of these studies were cross sectional. 
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The core of our dataset has already been collected while Balázs Vedres, the graduate student 
collaborating on this project, was working for the office of the Hungarian Prime Minister as a 
researcher of business networks.  Following the data collection strategy initiated by Stark (1996), 
Vedres and his assistants collected these data directly from the official courts of registry, where 
companies are obliged to register their top owners, the names of top and middle managers, their 
activities, locations of branch offices, etc. and any changes in these data with exact dates. 
Consequently, for any given firm in any given month, we can precisely identify the owners and 
the percentage of the assets each holds.  
 
To be most useful, the dataset already in hand will be augmented in several ways.  The structure 
of the current dataset was based on those firms that were in the top 500 rankings in 1999.   It 
therefore has a “retrospective” character since it traces back the histories of the firms that were 
large at the end of the period.  To include data on firms that were large at any point in the period 
but went bankrupt, were merged, or otherwise disappeared from the top 500 ranking by 1999, we 
will conduct new data collection to record the complete ownership histories of all firms that were 
among the largest 500 companies in any year during the twelve years, including those in the latest 
year 2000 rankings.  These inclusion rules result in approximately 1,800 firms. 
 
For the property (ownership and network structure) components of our study we will collect the 
following data: the names of the firm’s top twenty-five owners and the percentage stake that each 
holds in the company, and the names and addresses of its board of directors (recording any 
change on a monthly basis).  With these data on the links between firms for each of the 144 
months we will construct datasets on inter-enterprise ownership networks and interlocking 
directorate networks.  That is, we will have a data entry for each month indicating whether firm A 
owns or is owned by firm B as well as an entry indicating whether firm A and firm B share a 
director.  Because we are also collecting data on the top management of each firm, we will be 
able to identify cases of “directed ties” where a director on one company’s board is an officer in 
another firm in our population.   
 
In addition to data on property relations, we will also collect data on the following organizational 
features for each month for each firm: SIC codes of activity (to identify sectors as well as specify 
when a firm enters a new product field), raising or lowering of capital, location of establishments 
and branch offices, and top management (with names and positions).  Data on revenues, number 
of employees, and operating profit will be compiled from yearly balance sheets.  We will also 
collect data on the date of founding, dates of mergers, of changes in the legal form of the 
company, as well as dates of filings for bankruptcy or liquidation, completion of bankruptcy or 
liquidation, and cessation. 
 
With these data we will construct two panel-datasets: a dataset of firm attributes and a dataset of 
firm network ties.  Both of these panel-datasets will contain data on the firms for each month of 
the twelve years.  Thus, for a firm that existed throughout the entire period, we will have 144 data 
entries on each attribute and each network tie. 
 
After preliminary data analysis, we will conduct targeted interviews with enterprise managers, 
bankers, investors, and government agency officials to ascertain their perceptions of the 
constraints and opportunities they faced and to gain a deeper understanding of their 
interpretations and strategies.  We will also analyze surveys of enterprises, reports of risk 
assessment firms, enterprise annual reports, and articles from the business press to develop 





In this section we outline our strategy for analyzing the pathways of property transformation.  We 
conceptualize property along two dimensions: 1) a compositional dimension (a firm’s ownership 
structure) and 2) a positional dimension (a firm’s position in network structures).  We define these 
terms, indicate how we will operationalize the concepts, and present for each dimension a 
demonstration, in simplified form, of how we will use sequence analytic and network analytic 
methodologies.  For each dimension, we present some of our preliminary hypotheses, focusing here on 
our expectations about the relationships between property transformation and political, institutional, 
and market uncertainty.   
1) Enterprise pathways as changes in firms’ portfolios of owners. 
The compositional aspect of property.  Central to our analysis of property is the concept of 
portfolio. An investor’s portfolio, for example, is diversified across a range of instruments for 
hedging against risk and uncertainty. Our conceptual turn is to shift from an investor’s portfolio 
of holdings to the postsocialist firm’s portfolio of owners. Just as an investor’s portfolio is 
composed of the types of instruments and the proportions of each, so we think about a firm’s 
portfolio of owners as the different types of owners and the proportions of each. Going beyond 
the public/private dichotomy, our types of owners will include not only state institutions and 
private individuals but also other Hungarian enterprises (distinguishing financial/non financial), 
foreign individuals, and foreign multinationals (distinguishing financial/non-financial) and 
Hungarian local governments.  The composition of enterprise ownership portfolios will also be 
differentiated according to the proportions of these holdings by identifying, for example, whether 
a given firm’s ownership is concentrated or dispersed, whether the largest owner is clearly 
dominant, whether there is a coalition of several owners whose combined pluralities of shares are 
dominant, and so on. By cross-classifying the two compositional variables (discrete owners and 
their proportions) we construct a distinctive set of types of ownership portfolios. 
 
This typology provides the building blocks of our state-space along the compositional dimension 
of an enterprise career. Firms traverse through this state-space from one type of ownership 
portfolio to another, and we record these moves in this space as sequences. 
 
To illustrate our approach we have constructed a simplified hypothetical dataset of fifteen firms 
with careers spanning ten time spells. The first task is to construct a state-space by identifying the 
types of owners and their relative weight in the portfolio. One possibility that is suited to the 
ownership structures of Hungarian firms is to record the types of the largest owner, then record 
the second, third, fourth, etc. owner.  In this simplified example we consider the three largest 
owners. Our hypothetical state-space consists of 8 portfolio types. In portfolio types 1-3, firms 
have only one owner; types 4-6 are “coalitions” with only two owners, and so on.   (Our actual 
models will include more types of owners and will build from their proportional holdings, and not 
simply rank,  yielding more portfolio types.) 
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rank of owner as firm shareholder state code  
(portfolio types) largest owner 2nd largest  3rd largest 
1 state   
2 Hung firm   
3 foreign firm   
4 state foreign firm  
5 Hung firm state  
6 foreign firm Hung firm  
7 Hung firm Hung firm Hung firm 
8 Hung person Hung person Hung financial 
Table 1: Hypothetical ownership portfolio types – the portfolio state-space. 
 
For each of the fifteen firms in our demo we designate portfolio types for each of the ten time 
spells. The following table presents the three-pathway clustering solution for our hypothetical 
data. We have used OPTIMIZE, Abbott and Prellwitz’s (1997) optimal matching analysis2 
program, to generate the typical pathways of ownership portfolio careers. 
 
time spells 
firms t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 pathway 
a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
b 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 1 
c 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 7 7 2 1 
d 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 
h 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 
g 7 2 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 2 
f 1 7 7 7 7 2 2 8 8 8 2 
i 5 5 7 7 7 7 2 2 2 2 2 
j 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
k 2 2 2 7 7 7 2 2 7 7 2 
n 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 2 2 2 
e 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
l 1 2 2 6 6 6 3 3 3 3 3 
m 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
o 2 6 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Table 2: Pathways identified in our hypothetical data of ownership portfolio changes. 
 
Most firms in the first cluster (or pathway) start with the state as their only owner.  After some 
spells, we see portfolio diversification with a Hungarian firm or a foreign firm appearing as a 
partner to the state (i.e., portfolio types 4 or 5) with this pattern continuing through to the cut-off 
point. Although it is difficult to present turning points with such few data points (only 15 firms 
and only 10 time spells), we could consider the period from the fourth spell to the sixth as a 
turning point when the dominance of the state starts to fade away.   The careers of firms in the 
                                                 
2 Abbott and Prellwitz’s (1997) OPTIMIZE program compares two sequences by recording the number of 
modifications (or steps) that it took to make one sequence identical to the other. There are two ways to 
modify a sequence: substituting its elements with another or deleting or inserting elements. To refine the 
algorithm one can assign costs to these steps, so the output will be the total cost of making sequence X into 
sequence Y. If this cost is high, the two sequences contain different events. If the cost is low, the two 
sequences are similar. We have used the matrix of transitions to determine substitution costs by reversing 
and symmetrizing the transition matrix. The insertion/deletion cost was set to be equal to the maximal 
substitution cost. 
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second pathway, unlike those in the first pathway, “start” from a wide range of locations in the 
state-space, and they traverse through more diversified portfolios. The careers in this pathway 
have different temporalities; but they share a common event: a change from the 7th type of 
ownership portfolio (of two Hungarian firms as owner) to the 2nd type of portfolio (with a single 
Hungarian firm as owner). Because the dissolution of the Hungarian firm coalition portfolio takes 
place at many different points in the sequences that make up this type of career, there are no 
obvious turning points in this pathway. The third pathway shows yet another pattern: firms from 
different locations at the outset converge to the 3rd type of portfolio in which a foreign firm is the 
sole owner. The firms go through various diversified portfolios to arrive at having a single foreign 
owner.  Three of the four firms traverse a course that includes a “coalition” (the 4th and 6th 
portfolio types), and each dissolves into a solely foreign firm holding.  In this pathway the 
seventh time spell can be a good candidate for a turning point: after this spell, there are no 
changes in enterprise careers. 
 
The application of optimal matching techniques to our hypothetical data illustrates several 
features of sequence analysis.  Although our units of observation are firms, our units of analysis 
are pathways. That is, it is not the starting point and the endpoints that define pathways, but the 
similarities and dissimilarities of the patterns of whole careers. As we saw in our example, 
pathways can have diverse as well as uniform phases. Moreover, the temporality of firm careers 
can vary. Whereas some pathways exhibit clearly marked turning points in which all firms 
experience a shift in the direction of their careers, other pathways exhibit no turning points as 
firms make similar moves but with different timings.    
 
Our hypothetical example is simplified, indeed, impoverished by comparison to the rich data we 
are collecting.  With these data we can construct a much more refined state-space from the 
ownership portfolios (based on the exact percentage holdings of up to 25 owners) for 1,800 firms 
across 144 time spells.  From the analysis of the careers of these firms we can address how firms 
respond to uncertainty – which we will differentiate as institutional, political, and market 
uncertainties.    
 
Types of uncertainty.   Institutional uncertainties refer to the “rules of the game” of doing 
business (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; North 1981; Fligstein 1996b).  Such rules are normative, 
first in the sense of formalized regulations, but also in the sense of normative expectations about 
the behavior of others. We anticipate that institutional uncertainty is highest in the period from 
roughly 1992 to 1995. Although it might seem that new government regulations would reduce 
uncertainty (by specifying the new rules in a given domain), the cumulation of regulations 
actually increased uncertainty by raising questions about the interpretation of rules and their 
enforcement, as well as by increasing the anticipation of yet more rules in other domains. On 
January 1, 1992, for example, new rules took effect governing accounting, banking, and 
bankruptcy; and the unanticipated interactions among them produced a wave of filings for 
bankruptcy that led to a crisis of the entire financial system, a bailout of the banks, and a program 
of debt forgiveness for failing enterprises – thereby clouding rather than clarifying expectations 
about the “rules of the game” (Stark and Bruszt 1998).  Institutional uncertainty likely declines 
steadily after 1995 as the behavior of regulatory agencies becomes more predictable and firms 
mutually calibrate their expectations about contract enforcement.   
 
Very high immediately after 1989, political uncertainty rises through the installation of the first 
democratically-elected government, and shows a secular decline throughout the period – with 
episodes of increasing uncertainty immediately before and after parliamentary elections in 1994 
and 1998. Whereas firms confront institutional rules as applying to categories of firms, in a 
highly politicized environment, political uncertainty involves the possibility that government 
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actions will target a given firm in particular, whether as victim or beneficiary. Market uncertainty 
is uncertainty about access to resources (capital, labor, material inputs) and the ability to find 
customers.  In Hungary, it spikes in 1991-92 (with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the 
collapse of the COMECON market), declines thereafter, and then stays flat – but high relative to 
the other sources of uncertainty. 
 
As our discussion indicates, on the basis of our current knowledge of the field, we can 
preliminarily identify three periods.  To create more refined indices of levels of uncertainty, we 
will collect articles from the business press, from risk assessment firms, and from enterprise 
surveys, as well as consult with Hungarian specialists.  We anticipate that overall uncertainty is 
highest in the middle period (1992-1995) and lowest in the final period (1995-2000).  In each 
period, we anticipate that one form of uncertainty is paramount: political uncertainty marks the 
first period (1989-1992), institutional uncertainty is most salient in the middle period, and market 



















Figure 1: Hypothetical intensities of uncertainties over time. 
 
Ownership portfolios as responses to uncertainties.  Firms will hedge against uncertainty by 
attempting to manage their ownership portfolios. The difficulty in such hedging, however, is that 
there is no unitary “ideal” portfolio as a clearly dominant choice for every type of uncertainty. A 
portfolio that sheltered a firm in times of political turmoil, for example, might lead to bankruptcy 
in market upheavals or increased vulnerability to profound institutional changes.  
 
In periods of high institutional uncertainty we expect that firms aim for highly diversified 
portfolios.  Diversification should not be confused with highly dispersed ownership (so rare as to 
be almost non-existent in our population of Hungarian firms). Instead of many owners, 
diversified ownership portfolios exhibit a broader range of types of owners allowing the firm 
access to more diversified resources, especially information and knowledge from different parts 
of  the institutional fields relevant to its operations.  In this, they resemble the more diversified 
ownership and alliance portfolios of start-up firms in high technology (Powell et al 2001). When 
and where there is uncertainty about the evaluative criteria of performance, having multiple types 
of owners is a good hedging strategy for attempting to claim compliance with multiple criteria.  
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As performance criteria become less ambiguous and as the regulatory environment stabilizes, we 
expect less diversified ownership portfolios.    
 
In periods of high market uncertainty, we expect that firms will attempt to attract types of owners 
that can help provide sources of financing and reduce input/output uncertainties.  Thus, we expect 
ownership portfolios that include banks, foreign owners, suppliers and/or customers.  A bank as 
an owner holds the promise (not always realized) of privileged lines of credit; and a foreign 
owner can be a source of capital, technology, and predictable orders.  Supplier and buyer firms as 
owners can help reduce input/output uncertainties.  Acquiring a foreign owner might seem to be 
an ideal choice, but it usually comes with the risk of restructuring the firm and in many cases 
replacing top management. 
 
The various responses to uncertainties we have hypothesized are the building blocks of enterprise 
careers. We do not think that firms act in a hyper-rational way jumping to the optimal portfolio or 
network position immediately when they face a type of uncertainty. Ownership portfolios and 
network positions have rigidities: it is not easy to acquire new types of owners and join new 
groups instantaneously. On the other hand we do not think that firms are entirely locked-in to 
path dependencies regarding ownership portfolios and network positions. We depict firms to be 
somewhere in between these two extremes: they are sometimes able to alter their portfolios and 
network positions in abruptly novel ways, though in many cases their moves are limited by path 
dependencies. This image of firm behavior is what makes a career focus necessary: it enables us 
to identify stable path directions as well as abrupt turning points in typical firm careers.  What are 
the constellations of uncertainties and previous paths that enable firms to break away from path 
dependencies. Will firms react in novel ways when uncertainties are the highest? Or will they 
adopt a “small steps” strategy when uncertainty is extremely high leaving experimentation to 
times when uncertainties are not threatening their very existence? Will firms be paralyzed or will 
they boldly innovate when two or three types of uncertainties require them to move in more than 
one direction at the same time? 
 
2) Enterprise pathways as changes in firms’ network positions 
The positional aspect of property. In addition to thinking about ownership as the holding of a  
given entity in a firm, we should also think about an ownership relation as establishing a tie 
between actors. These ties are especially of interest when a given firm is owned by or is an owner 
of another firm in our population. We are also attentive to boards of directors (as the agents with 
fiduciary responsibility for exercising property rights), especially in cases where a top manager of 
one firm in our population is linked to another enterprise as a member of its board of directors. 
These ownership and directorship ties have network properties, that is, they have distinctive 
shapes or topologies that can be specified in network-analytic terms.  From our dataset of the 
ownership and directorship ties among our firms at each of the possible 144 monthly intervals, we 
will construct the histories of the business groups that are formed through these networks, and 
trace the pathways of positions that firms traverse within (or outside) these business group 
networks. 
 
Our first task is to map business groups and chart their life-cycles. In his review essay on business 
groups, Granovetter (1994) identifies the key structural dimensions for understanding variation 
among groups: size, industry composition (especially the participation of financial firms), the 
occupants of key positions, the level of cohesion, and the internal configuration of ties (especially 
the level of centralization). Our focus is not the variation across business groups along these 
dimensions at a certain point in time, but variation in the sequencing of group properties that 
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yield the distinctive pathways groups take across their life course. A group might start as small, 
homogenous in composition, and cohesive and non-centralized in its structure. As it grows, the 
composition might become heterogenous, might lose cohesion, or the shape of the group might be 
transformed around more central firms. A typical group might finish its life by falling apart, or it 
might merge into a single legal entity, a large multidivisional firm.  
 
To demonstrate our approach we again present a hypothetical dataset of 15 firms, this time with 
network data on one relation over ten time points. We have created a small, simplified dataset, ten 
sociomatrices with only one relation. The following figures show the graphs with optimized 
layouts that we generated using the PAJEK software (Batagelj and Mrvar 2001) and its graph 






















Figure 2: Graph representations of the network changes in our hypothetical dataset. 
 
The graphs of these ten time periods allow us to follow the emergence and dissipation of groups. 
We see two groups emerging clearly from the 5th time spell, “X” and “Y.” At their height in the 
7th spell, their members are the following: X={a, b, l, m, n, o}, while Y={c, d, e, f, g, k}. Group X 
starts as a clique-type group, but with the dissolution of ties it becomes a less cohesive and more 
centralized star-shaped group. Group Y, on the other hand, is a star-shaped group all along. Both 
groups have a period of formation and dissolution.  In our actual models we will be able to assess 
whether  group formations have a periodicity – perhaps with periods of rapid group expansion 
(see Gerlach 1992 on such periods in the case of the Japanese keiretsu) and periods of sharp 
contraction.   
 
The graphs of these ten time periods also allow us to focus on the changing position of firms. 
Whereas some firms are on the periphery of groups all along (e.g., “c”, “h”, “i”), we see other 
firms becoming central members (e.g., “a” and “d”) whose centrality later declines. Firm “j,” 
which had been in a dyad with “k” for five spells, becomes a bridge between groups X and Y for 
a brief spell at t7, and returns as a dyad with “k” before becoming an isolate.   
 
Tracing these enterprise pathways through such network positions is exactly what we want to do.  
But it’s difficult enough to follow each of our 15 hypothetical firms, and we could not hope to 
follow 1,800 firms across 144 PAJEK representations.  We will proceed by thinking about each 
of these positions as a state in a “network position state-space” just as we did for the previous 
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field of ownership portfolios. By recording the sequences of these positions and clustering them, 
we can find the patterns in these movements and thus identify the typical kinds of pathways in 
time.   
 
To demonstrate our approach we return to our hypothetical network of 15 firms over 10 spells. 
First we need to define the network positional states of firms. To do so we identify the shapes of 
groups where firms might participate as well as the theoretically important forms of participation. 
A simple set of states is the following: 
 
state code state description 
1 isolate 
2 dyad member owner 
3 dyad member owned 
4 star-shape group peripheral member 
5 star-shape group central member 
6 clique-shape group peripheral member  
7 clique-shape group central member 
8 bridge between groups 
Table 3: Hypothetical network positions – the network state-space. 
 
We use these state codes to describe the sequences of each firm. The sequences are represented in 
the following table, where cells contain one of the codes from the above table, and clustered (as 
with our ownership portfolio example) using the optimal matching algorithm: 
 
time spells 
firms t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 pathway 
a 1 2 2 4 4 7 7 7 5 5 1 
b 1 3 3 4 4 6 6 6 4 4 1 
d 1 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 
e 1 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 
j 1 3 3 3 3 3 8 4 3 3 1 
l 1 1 3 3 3 3 6 6 4 4 1 
n 1 1 3 4 4 6 6 6 4 4 1 
f 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 2 
g 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 2 
c 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 2 
h 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 
i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 
k 1 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 2 1 4 
m 1 1 2 2 2 2 6 6 1 1 4 
o 1 1 2 5 5 6 6 6 1 1 4 
Table 4: Pathways identified in our hypothetical data of ownership network position changes. 
 
Whereas the PAJEK graphs grouped firms according to their group membership, the optimal 
matching algorithm has clustered them according to similarities in the types of paths.  In the first 
pathway of network careers, firms get quickly connected as the owned member of a dyad, then 
they become (peripheral or central) members of a star-shaped group. Some of them are central 
group members at some point, but in the final spells they are mostly peripheral group members. 
In the second pathway we see firms that are isolates for a longer time than firms in other 
pathways. Then they join a star-shaped group as peripheral members and tend to remain in this 
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position. The third type of network career pathway is being an isolate all along. This is a 
completely event-less pathway, but it is not without interest. In fact, it is the lack of an event that 
happens to everyone else that makes this pathway interesting. The isolation of these firms in the 
first period is not a feature which distinguishes it from other pathways. In the middle period, 
however, when all other firms are members of a group, their isolation in a certain sense becomes 
an event. In the fourth pathway, firms become owners in dyads early on, then become group 
members (mostly central), and in the final time spells they are isolates or dyad members again. 
 
After collecting and coding data on more that 1,800 firms with entries for 144 time spells, we will 
be able to conduct an incomparably more refined analysis. Our state-space will be distilled from 
the actual typical network positions from 144 networks of two relations (owner and owned).  We 
will be able to chart, for example, the pathways to central positions in groups.  Do firms in central 
positions remain?  Are core positions retained despite changes in group position (see Gerlach 
1992)?  Can we recognize a typical firm career of balancing in between groups? Are there turning 
points when previously central firms become isolated and new central firms emerge? 
 
By framing these questions in terms of shifting political, institutional, and market uncertainties, 
moreover, we will address the lacunae noted by Koza and Lewin (2000) in their comprehensive 
review of the literature on inter-organizational alliances: “Rarely has research on alliances 
explicitly considered alliances to be embedded within the strategic portfolio of each partner 
and/or within accepted industry practices or as a function of the regulatory environment, 
institutional arrangements, and culture of the nation state or form of capitalism.”  
 
Networked properties as responses to uncertainties.  As in the case of ownership portfolios, 
we do not expect that there is one best type of network position that is a dominant choice for all 
companies in all types of uncertainties.  In general terms we expect that when overall 
uncertainties are high, network density will also be high;  the shapes or forms of network 
groupings and the composition of these groupings, however, will vary with the types of 
uncertainty.   
 
We expect that firms will respond to political uncertainties by having network ties to government 
institutions.  (We exclude state agencies’ ownership ties in our network models, thereby taking 
into account the fact that many firms will have state agencies as owners in the initial period as a 
legacy of state socialism.)  We expect that firms will co-opt government officials to their boards 
to minimize the possibility of an unfavourable decision against the firm and to lobby for special 
credits, subsidies, and debt forgiveness (Frydman and Rapaczyski 1996).   And we further expect 
some periodicity in these efforts corresponding to electoral cycles.  In addition to directorship ties 
to state officials, we also expect that firms that are not state-owned will build ties to state-owned 
firms.  These ties are likely to provide weaker opportunities for hedging, but they make it possible 
to avoid visible commitment to a politician or a political party that is not possible with direct 
cooptation. 
 
Under conditions of high institutional uncertainty we expect to find the formation of star-shaped 
groups.  At the center of the group is a holding firm that represents the group towards the state or 
business partners (see especially Keister 1998 on hierarchical, star-shaped business groups in 
China; and Johnson 1997 and Kim 2000 for similar examples in Russia). This structure provides 
flexibility in allocating assets and liabilities. Central firms can strip assets from the peripheral 
members; alternatively, structurally peripheral firms can accumulate assets and shift debts and 
liabilities to the holding center whose size (“too big to fail”) can increase the chances of 
exploiting ambiguities in the institutional regulations. The minimal version of this group is a 
dyad: an owner and an owned firm (or two firms mutually owning each other) where ties increase 
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possibilities to regroup assets, activities, and liabilities depending on expected legislation (or new 
patterns of enforcement) on bankruptcy, accounting, and bailouts. In the extreme case, one of the 
firms is driven into bankruptcy while the other is the “life boat” where assets and market niches 
are salvaged. 
 
We expect cohesive clique-shaped groups (with greater density of ties among the firms in the 
group) to form in several waves. The first episode of such group formation occurs in the early 
period of privatization in which firms exchanged shares with each other to comply with 
regulations requiring firms to adopt the legal form of a share-holding company. These groups are 
likely to include firms across a range of industries.  
 
We expect the second and third waves of cohesive clique formation to occur in periods of high 
market uncertainty. In contrast to the star-shaped group, this form provides better opportunities 
for recombining assets to occupy new market niches.  As firms forge ownership and directorship 
ties to buyers, sellers, and even competitors, these groups will form along industry lines. Whereas 
in periods of political uncertainty firms will form ties to state-owned firms, under conditions of 
market uncertainty they will form ties to firms that are owned by multinationals in the promise of 
becoming their suppliers or gaining access to new technologies without the threat of management 
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